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DE JONGH’S THEOREM FOR INTUITIONISTIC
ZERMELO-FRAENKEL SET THEORY
ROBERT PASSMANN
Abstract. We prove that the propositional logic of intuitionistic set theory
IZF is intuitionistic propositional logic IPC. More generally, we show that
IZF has the de Jongh property with respect to every intermediate logic that
is complete with respect to a class of finite trees. The same results follow for
CZF.
1. Introduction
De Jongh’s classical theorem [2] states that the propositional logic of Heyting
Arithmetic HA is intuitionistic logic IPC. In this work, we will prove de Jongh’s
theorem for intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory IZF. That is, for all proposi-
tional formulas ϕ:
IPC ⊢ ϕ if and only IZF ⊢ ϕσ for all substitutions σ.
To prove this result, we introduce a new semantics for IZF, the so-called blended
Kripke models, or blended models for short. These models are inspired by the
constructions of Iemhoff [1] and Lubarsky [6, 7, 8, 9], and combine Kripke semantics
with classical models of set theory.
Passmann [11] showed that Iemhoff’s models for bounded constructive set theory
allow to prove de Jongh’s theorem for a very weak set theory, strictly weaker than
CZF. This is because Iemhoff’s construction allows to choose a classical model of
set theory at every node of the Kripke frame, thus retaining a great amount of
control of the set-theoretic model on top. However, it can be shown that the same
method cannot yield de Jongh’s theorem for stronger set theories, such as CZF or
IZF.
Moreover, Passmann [10, Chapter 4] proved that the propositional logic of those
of Lubarsky’s models that are based on a Kripke frame with end-nodes contains
the intermediate logic KC. Consequently, the Lubarsky models based on such a
frame cannot be used to prove de Jongh properties with respect to logics weaker
than KC, such as IPC.
The blended models have more flexibility than Lubarsky’s models and model a
stronger set theory than Iemhoff’s models, and can therefore be used to prove de
Jongh’s theorem for IZF.
In fact, we will prove a stronger result concerning the de Jongh property for
IZF: The de Jongh property is a generalisation of de Jongh’s theorem for arbitrary
theories and intermediate logics (see Definition 12). Our main result can be stated
as follows.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 34). Intuitionistic set theory IZF has the de Jongh property
with respect to every intermediate logic J that is characterised by a class of finite
trees.
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In particular, IZF has the de Jongh property with respect to the logics IPC, LC,
Tn and BDn. As constructive set theory CZF is a subtheory of IZF, all of these
results also apply for CZF (see Corollary 37).
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the necessary preliminaries
for this article. We introduce blended models in section 3 and prove that they
satisfy intuitionistic set theory IZF. In section 4, we consider the propositional
logic of blended models and prove de Jongh’s theorem for IZF. We draw some
conclusions and state a few questions for further research in section 5.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we will discuss the preliminaries for the later sections. After
briefly discussing notation and intermediate logics in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2,
respectively, we will introduce Kripke semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic
in Section 2.3. We will then discuss the de Jongh property in Section 2.4.
2.1. Notation and meta-theory. We adopt the following notational policy: The
symbol  will be used for the forcing relation of Kripke models. As usual, we will
use  for the classical modelling relation, and ⊢ for the provability relation.
The meta-theory of this article is classical Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZFC as-
suming the existence of a countable transitive model of set theory.
2.2. Intuitionistic and intermediate logics. We fix a countable set Prop of
propositional variables for the scope of this article, and identify propositional logics
L with the set of formulas they prove (i.e., L ⊢ ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ L). As usual, we
denote intuitionistic propositional logic by IPC, and classical propositional logic
by CPC. We say that a logic J is an intermediate logic if IPC ⊆ J ⊆ CPC (in
particular, IPC and CPC are considered intermediate logics here). Intuitionistic
predicate logic is called IQC.
2.3. Kripke frames. We will now introduce Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic.
In particular, we will focus on Kripke frames that are trees because these will be
relevant for us later.
Definition 2. A Kripke frame (K,≤) is a partial order. We call a Kripke frame
(K,≤) a tree if for every v ∈ K, the set K≤v = {w ∈ K |w ≤ v} is well-ordered by
<, and moreover, if there is a node r ∈ K such that r ≤ v for all v ∈ K (i.e., K is
rooted). A Kripke frame is called finite whenever K is finite.
Definition 3. Given a Kripke frame (K,≤), we define EK to be its set of end-
nodes, i.e., the set of those e ∈ K that are maximal with respect to ≤. A Kripke
frame (K,≤) with end-nodes is a Kripke frame such that for every v ∈ K there
is some e ∈ EK with v ≤ e. Given a node v ∈ K, let Ev denote the set of all
end-nodes e ∈ K such that e ≥ v.
The following combinatorial proposition will be useful later when we will deter-
mine the propositional logic of certain Kripke models. An upset X in a Kripke
frame (K,≤) is a set X ⊆ K such that v ∈ X and v ≤ w implies w ∈ X . Given
a finite tree (K,≤) and a node v ∈ K, let Uv be the number of upsets X ⊆ K≥v,
where K≥v = {w ∈ K |w ≥ v}.
Proposition 4. In a finite tree (K,≤), every node v is uniquely determined by Uv
and the set of end-nodes e with e ≥ v.
Proof. This follows by an easy induction on trees. The base case for a tree with
one node is trivial. For the construction step, where we add a new root below one
or many trees, observe that the uniqueness within the branches is preserved and
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for the new bottom node as well, as it has strictly more up-sets X ⊆ K≥v than any
other node in the tree. 
A Kripke model for IPC is a triple (K,≤, V ) such that (K,≤) is a Kripke frame
and V : Prop → P(K) a valuation that is persistent, i.e., if w ∈ V (p) and w ≤ v,
then v ∈ V (p). We can then define, by induction on propositional formulas, the
forcing relation  for propositional logic at a node v ∈ K in the following way:
(i) K,V, v  p if and only if v ∈ V (p),
(ii) K,V, v  ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if K,V, v  ϕ and K,V, v  ψ,
(iii) K,V, v  ϕ ∨ ψ if and only if K,V, v  ϕ or K,V, v  ψ,
(iv) K,V, v  ϕ→ ψ if and only if
for all w ≥ v, K,V,w  ϕ implies K,V,w  ψ,
(v) K,V, v  ⊥ holds never.
Sometimes we will write v  ϕ instead of K,V, v  ϕ, and K,V  ϕ if K,V, v  ϕ
holds for all v ∈ K. A formula ϕ is valid in K if K,V, v  ϕ holds for all valuations
V on K and v ∈ K, and ϕ is valid if it is valid in every Kripke frame K.
By induction on formulas, one can prove that the persistence of the propositional
variables transfers to all formulas.
Proposition 5 (Persistence). Let (K,≤, V ) be a Kripke model for IPC, v ∈ K
and ϕ be a propositional formula such that K, v  ϕ holds. Then K,w  ϕ holds
for all w ≥ v. 
We can now define the logic of a Kripke frame and of a class of Kripke frames.
Definition 6. If (K,≤) is a Kripke frame for IPC, we define the propositional
logic L(K,≤) to be the set of all propositional formulas that are valid in K. For a
class K of Kripke frames, we define the propositional logic L(K) to be the set of all
propositional formulas that are valid in all Kripke frames (K,≤) in K. Given an
intermediate logic J, we say that K characterises J if L(K) = J.
We might write L(K) for L(K,≤). Let us conclude this section with a few
examples of logics and the classes of Kripke frames they are characterised by. For
the proofs of these characterisations, we refer to the literature.
Proposition 7 ([12, Theorem 6.12]). Intuitionistic propositional logic IPC is char-
acterised by the class of all finite trees.
Example 8. We present some examples of logics from [3] that are characterised
by classes of finite trees.
(i) Dummett’s logic LC is the logic obtained by extending IPC with the
scheme (p → q) ∨ (q → v). The logic LC is characterised by the class
of finite linear orders.
(ii) The Gabbay-de Jongh logics Tn, for n ∈ N, are characterised by the class
of finite trees which have splittings of exactly n, i.e., every node is either
an end-node or has exactly n successors. T1 coincides with LC, and the
logics Tn are axiomatised by the following formulas:
∧
k≤n+1



ϕk → ∧
j 6=k
ϕj

→ ∧
j 6=k
ϕj

→ ∧
k≤n+1
ϕk.
(iii) The logics of bounded depth n BDn, for n ∈ N, are characterised by the
finite trees of depth n. The logic of depth 1, BD1 is classical logic CPC
axiomatised by β1 = ((ϕ1 → ψ) → ϕ1) → ϕ1 (Pierce’s law). For every
n, the logics BDn is axiomatised by βn, which is obtained via a recursive
definition, βn+1 = ((ϕn+1 → βn)→ ϕn+1)→ ϕn+1.
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2.4. The de Jongh property. In this section, we will introduce the de Jongh
property and provide a framework for proving it. For a detailed history of de
Jongh’s theorem and the de Jongh property see [3].
Definition 9. Let ϕ be a propositional formula and let σ : Prop→ Lsent∈ an assign-
ment of propositional variables to L∈-sentences. By ϕσ we denote the L∈-sentence
obtained from ϕ by replacing each propositional variable p with the sentence σ(p).
The de Jongh property is a generalisation of de Jongh’s classical result [2] con-
cerning Heyting arithmetic HA and intuitionistic propositional logic IPC.
Theorem 10 (de Jongh, [2]). Let ϕ be a formula of propositional logic. Then
HA ⊢ ϕσ for all σ : Prop→ Lsent
HA
if and only if IPC ⊢ ϕ.
Given a theory based on intuitionistic logic, we may consider its propositional
logic, i.e., the set of propositional formulas that are derivable after substituting the
propositional letters by arbitrary sentences in the language of the theory.
Definition 11. Let T be a theory in intuitionistic predicate logic, formulated in a
language L. A propositional formula ϕ will be called T-valid if and only if T ⊢ ϕσ
for all σ : Prop → Lsent. The propositional logic L(T) is the set of all T-valid
formulas.
Given a theory T and an intermediate logic J, we denote by T(J) the theory
obtained by closing T under J.
Definition 12. We say that a theory T has the de Jongh property if L(T) = IPC.
The theory T has the de Jongh property with respect to an intermediate logic J if
L(T(J)) = J.
De Jongh’s theorem is equivalent to the assertion that Heyting arithmetic has
the de Jongh property.
3. Blended models
In this section, we will construct the blended models and show that they are
models of intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory IZF.
3.1. Constructing blended models. We will now construct a blended model
based on a given Kripke frame (K,≤) with end-nodes. To every end-node e ∈ K,
we associate a transitive transitive model Me of set theory such that Ord
Me0 =
OrdMe1 for all e0, e1 ∈ EK . For the remainder of this section, fix such a collection
〈Me | e ∈ EK〉. Note that Ord
Me denotes the same ordinal in the meta-universe for
all e ∈ EK ; we can therefore refer to this ordinal by Ord
Me without specifying a
particular e ∈ EK .
The construction of the blended models happens in three steps. We begin by
constructing the collection of domains 〈Dv | v ∈ K〉: First the domains for the end-
nodes and, secondly, for all remaining nodes of the Kripke frame. The third step is
to define the semantics of the ∈-relation.
Step 1. Domains for end-nodes: Given an end-node e ∈ EK of (K,≤), and
the associated model Me, we define a function fe : Me → V as follows by
∈-recursion:
fe(x) = (e, fe[x]).
Let De = fe[Me]. Hence, each De is a set of functions x : K≥e → ran(x)
(where K≥e = {e}). Moreover, for α ∈ OrdM , let Dαe = fe[(Vα)
Me ]. Then
D0e = ∅ and it holds that ⋃
α∈OrdM
Dαe = De.
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In Proposition 16 below, we will see that the domains of the end-nodes
of a blended model are isomorphic (with respect to the equality and mem-
bership relations) to the classical model of set theory associated to the
node.
Step 2. Domains for all nodes: Now we are ready to define the domains at the
remaining nodes. We do this simultaneously for all v ∈ K\EK by induction
on α ∈ OrdMe . Let Dαv consist of the functions x : K
≥v → ran(x) such
that the following properties hold:
(i) for all end-nodes e ≥ v, we have x ↾ {e} ∈ Dαe ,
(ii) for all non-end-nodes w ≥ v, we have x(w) ⊆
⋃
β<αD
β
w, and
(iii) for all nodes u ≥ w ≥ v we have that {y ↾ K≥u | y ∈ x(w)} ⊆ x(u).
We use the restriction maps fwu with x 7→ x ↾ K
≥u as transition functions
for the domains. Note that this map is well-defined by the definition of the
domains. In particular, fwu ◦ fvw = fvu.
By the definition of the maps fvw, it is clear that condition (i) is just a
special case of condition (iii). We state it separately as it requires special
attention when working with blended models.
Finally, we define the domain Dv at the node v to be the set
Dv =
⋃
α∈OrdM
Dαv .
Step 3. Defining the semantics: We define, by induction on L∈-formulas, the
forcing relation at every node of the Kripke model in the following way,
where ϕ and ψ are formulas with all free variables shown, and, moreover,
y¯ = y0, . . . , yn−1 are elements of Dv for the node v considered on the left
side:
(i) (K,≤,D), v  x ∈ y if and only if x ∈ y(v),
(ii) (K,≤,D), v  a = b if and only if a = b,
(iii) (K,≤,D), v  ∃xϕ(x, y¯) if and only if there is some a ∈ Dv
with (K,≤,D), v  ϕ(a, y¯),
(iv) (K,≤,D), v  ∀xϕ(x, y¯) if and only if for all w ≥ v and a ∈ Dw
we have (K,≤,D), w  ϕ(a, y¯).
The cases for →, ∧, ∨ and ⊥ are analogous to the ones in the above defi-
nition of the forcing relation for Kripke models for IPC.
This finishes the definition of the blended models.
Definition 13. We call (K,≤,D) the blended Kripke model obtained from 〈Me | e ∈
EK〉.
If the collection 〈Me | e ∈ EK〉 is either clear from the context, or if it does not
matter, we will also say that (K,≤,D) a blended Kripke model. We will usually say
blended model instead of blended Kripke model.
An L∈-formula ϕ is valid in (K,≤,D) if v  ϕ holds for all v ∈ K, and ϕ is valid
if it is valid in every Kripke frame K. We will call (K,≤) the underlying Kripke
frame of (K,≤,D), or the frame that (K,≤,D) is based on. Moreover, let us call
JϕK(K,≤,D,e) = {v ∈ K | v  ϕ} the truth set of a sentence ϕ in the language of set
theory in a blended model (K,≤, D, e). When the model is clear from the context,
we will also write JϕKK or just JϕK.
Before we continue with some basic properties of the blended models, let us
briefly discuss this construction in comparison to Lubarsky’s Kripke models [6, 7,
8, 9], which are constructed in a similar way. The crucial difference, however, is that
our models are constructed in a top-down manner that allows to choose classical
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Extensionality: ∀a∀b(∀x(x ∈ a↔ x ∈ b)→ a = b)
Empty set: ∃a ∀x ∈ a ⊥
Pairing: ∀a∀b∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ (x = a ∨ x = b))
Union: ∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ ∃u(u ∈ a ∧ x ∈ u))
Power set: ∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ⊆ a)
Infinity: ∃a(∃x x ∈ a ∧ ∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ a x ∈ y)
Set Induction: (∀a(∀x ∈ a ϕ(x) → ϕ(a))) → ∀aϕ(a), for all formulas ϕ(x).
Separation: ∀a∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ (x ∈ a ∧ ϕ(x))), for all formulas ϕ(x).
Collection: ∀a(∀x ∈ a∃y ϕ(x, y) → ∃b∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ b ϕ(x, y)), for all formulas
ϕ(x, y), where b is not free in ϕ(x, y).
Figure 1. The axioms of IZF.
models of set theory at the end-nodes, whereas Lubarsky’s bottom-up construction
requires elementary equivalence.
3.2. Basic properties. We will now observe some basic properties of the blended
models.
Proposition 14 (Persistence). Let (K,≤,D) be a blended model and ϕ a for-
mula in the language of set theory. If v  ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) and w ≥ v, then
w  ϕ(fvw(a0), . . . , fvw(an−1)).
Proof. This is proved by induction on L∈-formulas 
Proposition 15. The blended models are sound with respect to IQC.
Proof. This follows from the more general soundness result for Kripke models for
predicate logics with respect to IQC. See, for example, [12, Theorem 6.6]. 
We will now make the essential observation that the domains at the end-nodes
are isomorphic to the models they were obtained from.
Proposition 16. Let (K,≤,D) be a blended model, and e ∈ EK . Then (K,≤
,D), e  ϕ(fe(a0), . . . , fe(an−1)) if and only ifMe  ϕ(a0, . . . , an−1) for all elements
a0, . . . , an−1 ∈Me.
Proof. Let us first argue that fe :Me → De is a bijection. Define g by ∈-recursion
with (e, x) 7→ g[x]. It follows by induction that g ◦ fe = idMe and fe ◦ g = idDe .
Hence, fe is a bijection.
It suffices to prove the claim for the atomic cases: equality and set-membership.
The case for equality follows from the definition of the semantics and the fact that
f is bijective. For set-membership observe that ifMe  x ∈ y, then fe(x) ∈ fe(y)(e)
and hence e  fe(x) ∈ fe(y). Conversely, if e  fe(x) ∈ fe(y), then fe(x) ∈ fe(y)(e)
and hence x = g(fe(x)) ∈ g(fe(y)) = y. The other cases follow trivially as the
intuitionistic interpretation of the logical symbols in an end-node coincides with
the classical interpretation in the model Me. 
3.3. IZF holds in blended models. In this section, we will show that the axioms
of IZF (see Figure 1) hold in blended models. For the sake of this section, let
(K,≤,D) be a blended model obtained from 〈Me | e ∈ EK〉.
Note that IZF trivially holds true at every end-node because the models associ-
ated with the end-nodes are, in fact, models of ZF set theory.
Proposition 17. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom of extensionality.
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Proof. Let v ∈ K and a, b ∈ Dv. We have to show that
v  ∀x(x ∈ a↔ x ∈ b)→ a = b.
So assume that w  ∀x(x ∈ a ↔ x ∈ b) for all w ≥ v, i.e., a(w) = b(w) for all
w ≥ v. Hence, a and b are equal as functions with domain K≥v, and so they are
equal. 
Proposition 18. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom of pairing.
Proof. Let v ∈ K and a, b ∈ Dv. Let c be the function with c(w) = {fvw(a), fvw(b)}
for all w ≥ v.
Let us first show that c ∈ Dv. For condition (i), let e ≥ v be an end-node. As
a, b ∈ Dv it follows from the definition that fve(a), fve(b) ∈ De. Hence, by pairing
in Me, we have that c ↾ {e} ∈ De, where c(e) = {fve(a), fve(b)}. Conditions (ii)
and (iii) of the definition of Dv follow directly from the definition of c.
Now it is straightforward to check that c constitutes a witness for the axiom of
pairing for a and b at the node v. 
Proposition 19. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom of union.
Proof. Let v ∈ K and a ∈ Dv. Define a function b with domain K≥v with b(w) =⋃
c∈a(w) c(w) for all w ≥ v.
Again, we need to show that b ∈ Dv. For condition (i), observe that fve(a) ∈ De
for every end-node e ≥ v. As the axiom of union holds inMe, it follows that there is
a witness b′ ∈ De. By transitivity of Me, it must then hold that b ↾ {e} = b′ ∈ De.
As in the previous proposition, conditions (ii) and (iii) follow directly from the
definition of b. Then b witnesses the axiom of union for a. 
Proposition 20. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom of empty set.
Proof. For every v ∈ K consider the empty function with domain K≥v. This is an
element of Dv and witnesses the axiom of empty set. 
Proposition 21. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom of infinity.
Proof. By recursion on natural numbers, we will define elements nv ∈ Dv simul-
taneously for every v ∈ K. Let 0v be the empty set as defined in the proof of
Proposition 20. Then, if mv has been defined for all m < n, let nv be the function
with nv(w) = {0w, . . . , (n − 1)w} for all w ≥ v. This finishes the recursive defini-
tion. It follows inductively that every nv ∈ Dv, again paying special attention at
the end-nodes: the sets ne correspond to the finite ordinal n ∈Me.
Finally, let ωv(w) = {nw |n < ω} for all w ≥ v. To see that ωv ∈ Dv note that,
for every end-node e ≥ v, fve(ωv) = ωe ∈ De as Me satisfies the axiom of infinity.
It follows that ωv is a witness for the axiom of infinity at the node v. 
Proposition 22. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom scheme of separation.
Proof. Let ϕ(x, y0, . . . , yn) be a formula with all free variables shown. Let v ∈ K,
a ∈ Dv and b0, . . . , bn ∈ Dv. Define c to be the function with domainK≥v such that
c(w) = {d ∈ a(w) |w  ϕ(d, b0, . . . , bn)} holds for all w ≥ v. We have that c ∈ Dv
by the definition of the domains Dv. Again, property (i) follows from the fact that
separation holds in Me for every end-node model Me. Moreover, property (iii)
follows by persistence. Finally, c witnesses separation from a by ϕ with parameters
bi. 
Proposition 23. If K is finite, then the model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom scheme
of collection.
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Proof. Let v ∈ K, ϕ(x, y) be a formula (possibly with parameters), and a ∈ Dv.
We need to show that:
v  ∀x ∈ a∃y ϕ(x, y)→ ∃b∀x ∈ a∃y ∈ b ϕ(x, y).
So let us additionally assume that v  ∀x ∈ a∃yϕ(x, y), i.e., for every w ≥ v and
every x ∈ a(w) there exists some y ∈ Dw such that w  ϕ(x, y). Let α be the
minimal ordinal such that for every w ≥ v and x ∈ a(w), there is some y ∈ Dαw
with w  ϕ(x, y). Note that α < OrdMe as K is finite. Define b to be the function
with domain K≥v such that b(v) = Dαw. It follows that b ∈ Dv, where the case for
end-nodes e follows from the fact that (Vα)
Me is a set in Me. Hence, b is a witness
for the above instance of the collection scheme. 
Proposition 24. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the powerset axiom.
Proof. Let v ∈ K and a ∈ Dv. Define a function b with domain K≥v such that
b(w) = {c ∈ Dw |w  c ⊆ fvw(a)}
for all w ≥ v. We have to show that b ∈ Dv. Observe that for every end-node e ≥ v,
fve(b) corresponds to (P(a))
Me , and hence condition (i) is satisfied. Conditions (ii)
and (iii) follow easily. 
Proposition 25. The model (K,≤,D) satisfies the axiom scheme of set induction.
Proof. The scheme of set induction follows by an induction on the rank α of Dαv
simultaneously for all v ∈ K. In particular, we use the fact that the models Me
associated with the end-nodes are transitive models of set theory. 
Let us summarise the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 26. If K is finite, then the model (K,≤,D) satisfies IZF. For arbitrary
K, the model (K,≤,D) satisfies IZF− Collection. 
3.4. An example. Let us consider an easy example of a blended model with a
failure of the law of excluded middle.
Example 27. To illustrate our construction above, we will construct a Kripke
model (K,≤,D) such that (K,≤,D) 6 CH ∨ ¬CH. Take (K,≤) to be the three
element Kripke frame (K,≤) with K = {v, e0, e1} with ≤ being the reflexive closure
of the relation defined by v ≤ e0 and v ≤ e1 (see Figure 2).
v 6 CH ∨ ¬CH
e0  CH e1  ¬CH
Figure 2. An example of a blended model constructed from end-
models Me0 and Me1 with Me0  CH and Me0  ¬CH.
Now, let M be any countable transitive model of ZFC + CH, and take G to be
generic for Cohen forcing over M . Then we associate the model M with node e0,
andM [G] with e1, i.e.,Me0 = M andMe1 = M [G]. By our construction above and
Proposition 16, (K,≤,D), e0  CH and (K,≤,D), e1  ¬CH. Hence, by persistence,
(K,≤,D), v 6 CH ∨ ¬CH.
In particular, this also shows that IZF 6⊢ CH ∨ ¬CH, i.e., the law of excluded
middle does not hold for assertions regarding the continuum.
One can easily generalise the above argument to obtain the following proposition.
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Proposition 28. If ϕ is a sentence in the language of set theory such that there
are models M and N of ZFC with M  ϕ and N  ¬ϕ, then IZF 6⊢ ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. 
4. The propositional logic of blended models
In this section, we will analysis the propositional logic of blended models and
prove the de Jongh property for IZF with respect to intermediate logics that are
characterised by a class of finite trees.
4.1. Faithful blended models. The aim of this section is to show that we can
find a blended model based on every finite tree Kripke frame (K,≤) that allows us
to imitate every valuation on (K,≤). Let us begin with a definition and several
useful observations.
Definition 29. An blended model (K,≤,D) is called faithful if for every valuation
V on the Kripke frame (K,≤) and every propositional letter p ∈ Prop, there is an
L∈-formula ϕp such that JϕpK(K,≤,D) = V (p).
This notion was first introduced in [10]. For further discussion and connections
to the de Jongh property, see also [11].
Given a natural number n, let ψn be the following sentence
1 in the language of
set theory:
∀x0, . . . , xn−1

∧
i<n
(∀y ∈ xi∀z ∈ y⊥)→
∧
i<j<n
xi = xj

 .
Informally, this sentence asserts that given n subsets of 1, at least 2 of them are
equal.
The following proposition holds for all Kripke frames with end-nodes and not
only for finite trees. We also do not need to assume that Uv is finite; recall that we
defined Uv in Section 2.3 to be the number of upsets X ⊆ K≥v.
Proposition 30. Let (K,≤) be a Kripke frame with end-nodes, (K,≤,D) be a
blended model, and v ∈ K. For every natural number n, we have that v  ψn+1 if
and only if n ≥ Uv.
Proof. Given any upset X ⊆ K≥v, we define the element 1vX to be the function
K≥v →
⋃
w≥v
Dw, w 7→
{
{0w}, if w ∈ X,
∅, otherwise.
Observe that 1vX ∈ Dv as it is monotone because X is an upset. Further, we
have 1vX 6= 1
v
Y for upsets X 6= Y and therefore, v 6 1
v
X = 1
v
Y . It follows that
v  ∀y ∈ 1vX∀z ∈ y⊥ for all upsets X because 1
v
X(w) is either empty or contains
the empty set for w ≥ v. We conclude that v 6 ψn+1 for n < Uv taking the 1vX as
witnesses.
Conversely, assume that n ≥ Uv. We will first show that whenever v  ∀y ∈
x∀z ∈ y⊥ for some x ∈ Dv, then x is actually of the form 1vX for some upset
X ⊆ K≥v. For contradiction, assume that x was not of the form 1vX for some upset
X . Then there is a node w ≥ v such that x(w) contains an element y different
from 0w. But then there must be a node u ≥ w such that y(w) is non-empty.
This is a contradiction to v  ∀y ∈ x∀z ∈ y⊥, and hence, every element x ∈ Dv
satisfying the above formula must be of the form 1vX . As there are only Uv-many
1These sentences were discovered in a discussion with Lorenzo Galeotti and Benedikt Löwe
regarding the logics of algebra-valued models of set theory, see also [5]. We adapt them here for
the case of Kripke semantics.
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elements 1vX , we know that the conclusion of ψn+1 must be true at the node v.
Hence, v  ψn+1. 
The following proposition is a special case of a more general proposition for
Kripke models of predicate logic.
Proposition 31. Let (K,≤) be a Kripke frame with end-nodes, (K,≤,D) be a
blended model and v ∈ K. If e 6 ϕ for all end-nodes e ≥ v, then v  ¬ϕ.
Proof. By the definition of our semantics, we know that v  ¬ϕ if and only if w 6 ϕ
for all w ≥ v. Assume that there was a node w ≥ v such that w  ϕ. By persistence
we can conclude that e  ϕ for every end-node e ≥ w, a contradiction. 
Theorem 32. Let (K,≤,D) be a blended model based on a finite tree (K,≤) with
end-nodes e0, . . . , en−1. If there is a collection of ∈-sentences ϕi for i < n such that
ej  ϕi if and only if i = j, then (K,≤,D) is faithful.
Proof. Let (K,≤,D) be a blended model based on a finite tree (K,≤) with end-
nodes e0, . . . , en−1 such that there is a collection of ∈-sentences ϕi for i < n such
that ej  ϕi if and only if i = j.
As (K,≤) is a finite tree, we know by Proposition 4 that every node v ∈ K is
uniquely determined by Uv and the set of end-nodes e ≥ v.
Let V be a valuation on (K,≤). For every p ∈ Prop, we need to find a sentence
ψp in the language of set theory such that JψpK
(K,≤,D) = V (p). Due to finiteness
of K, it suffices to consider upsets of the form K≥v for some v ∈ K because more
general upsets can be covered by disjunctions.
We will now prove for every v ∈ K that there is a sentence χv in the language
of set theory such that (K,≤,D), w  χv if and only if w ≥ v (i.e., w ∈ K≥v). Let
χv be the following sentence, where n = Uv + 1:
ψn ∧
∧
ei 6≥v
¬ϕi
By Proposition 30 and Proposition 31 it is clear that w  χv for all w ≥ v. For the
converse direction, let w ∈ K such that w 6≥ v. There are two cases.
First, if w < v, then Uw > Uv = n and hence w 6 ψn by Proposition 30. Hence,
it follows that w 6 χv.
Second, if w 6< v, then there must be an end-node ei ≥ w such that ei 6≥ v. By
assumption ei  ϕi and hence, w 6 ¬ϕi. But this means that w 6 χv.
This concludes the proof of the theorem. 
Theorem 33. Let (K,≤) be a finite tree. Then there is a faithful blended model
(K,≤,D) based on (K,≤).
Proof. Let e0, . . . , en−1 be the set of end-nodes of (K,≤). Let M be a countable
transitive model of ZFC set theory. By set-theoretic forcing, we can obtain generic
extensions M [Gi] of M such that M [Gi]  2
ℵ0 = ℵi+1 for every i < n (see, e.g.,
[4] for details). Let Mei = M [Gi], and (K,≤,D) be the blended model obtained
from 〈Mi | i < n〉. Clearly, Mei  2
ℵ0 = ℵj+1 if and only if i = j. This implies, by
Proposition 16, that ei  2
ℵ0 = ℵj+1 if and only if i = j. In this situation, we can
apply Theorem 32 to conclude that (K,≤,D) is faithful. 
4.2. The de Jongh property for IZF. In this section, we will draw conclusions
regarding the de Jongh property of IZF from the main result of the previous section.
Theorem 34. Intuitionistic set theory IZF has the de Jongh property with respect
to every intermediate logic J that is characterised by a class of finite trees.
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Proof. Let J be an intermediate logic with L(K) = J, where K is a class of finite
trees. We have to show that L(IZF(J)) = J, i.e., for every propositional formula,
we have that:
J ⊢ ϕ if and only if IZF(J) ⊢ ϕσ for all substitutions σ : Prop→ Lsent∈ .
The direction from left to right is immediate from the definition of IZF(J). We will
prove the converse direction by contraposition.
Assume that there is ϕ such that J 6⊢ ϕ. As J is characterised by K, there is
a frame (K,≤) ∈ K and a valuation V such that (K,≤), V 6 ϕ. By Theorem 33
and the assumption that K consists of finite trees, we can find a faithful blended
model (K,≤,D) based on (K,≤). For every propositional letter p ∈ Prop, let ψp
be a sentence in the language of set theory such that JψpK
(K,≤,D) = V (p). Define
an assignment σ : Prop→ Lsent∈ by σ(p) = ψp.
We prove by induction on propositional formulas χ, simultaneously for all v ∈ K
that:
(K,≤), v  χ if and only if (K,≤,D), v  χσ.
The base case for propositional letters follows directly from the definition of σ.
Furthermore, the induction cases for the connectives →, ∧ and ∨ follow directly
from the fact that their semantics coincide in Kripke models for IPC and in blended
models. This finishes the induction.
Hence, it follows from the induction that (K,≤,D) 6 ϕσ, and therefore, ϕ /∈
L(IZF(J)). This finishes the proof of the theorem. 
Corollary 35. Intuitionistic set theory IZF has the de Jongh property.
Proof. By Proposition 7, we know that IPC is complete with respect to the class
of all finite trees, i.e., this class characterises IPC. By the previous Theorem 34,
this implies that IZF has the de Jongh property. 
More examples of logics that are characterised by classes of finite trees are Gödel-
Dummett logic LC, the Gabbay-de Jongh logics Tn, and the logics of bounded
depth BDn (see Example 8).
Corollary 36. Intuitionistic set theory IZF has the de Jongh property with respect
to the logics LC, Tn and BDn. 
In [11], the author proved that bounded constructive set theory has the de Jongh
property with respect to every Kripke-complete logic. With the techniques used
there, it was (provably) not possible to extend the result to CZF. However, we can
now derive a result for CZF.
Corollary 37. Constructive set theory CZF has the de Jongh property with respect
to every intermediate logic J that is characterised by a class of finite trees.
Proof. We have to show that J ⊢ ϕ if and only if CZF(J) ⊢ ϕσ for all σ : Prop →
Lsent∈ . The implication from left to right is trivial. We prove the other direction by
contraposition. So assume that J 6⊢ ϕ. By Theorem 34, there is some σ such that
IZF(J) 6⊢ ϕσ. As CZF ⊆ IZF, it follows that CZF(J) 6⊢ ϕσ. 
We have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 38. Intuitionistic set theory IZF has the de Jongh property with re-
spect to every intermediate logic.
12 ROBERT PASSMANN
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we defined a class of Kripke models for intuitionistic set theory
IZF. We then used these models to prove a range of de Jongh properties for IZF
and CZF.
Question 39. Can we obtain independence results for IZF with blended models?
Question 40. Is it possible to vary the construction of blended models to provide
proper models of CZF (i.e., models of CZF that are not also models of IZF)?
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